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1Six Reasons for Invoking 
Evolution in  Decision Theory
Peter Hammerstein and Jeffrey R. Stevens
It is in biology and psychology that economists and other social scientists will 
fi nd the premises needed to fashion more predictive models.—E. O. Wilson 
(1998:206)
In 2012, a “Mega Millions” lottery in the United States set a world record with 
a jackpot of $656 million. The estimated odds of winning the jackpot were 1 
in over 175,000,000. Despite the terrible odds, this lottery generated a frenzy 
of ticket purchases: 650 million tickets were sold in three days. Why would so 
many people gamble on such poor odds?
On a cold winter morning, a young black-capped chickadee (Poecile atrica-
pillus) awakens from sleep, very hungry. She faces the choice of fl ying off to 
an area with a low but consistent supply of seeds or an area with the possibility 
of many or no seeds (Barkan 1990). Which should she choose?
In both of these examples, a decision must be made on whether to gamble 
on a risky option or stick with a safe option. How do organisms make these 
decisions? The study of games and decisions has long been guided by a philo-
sophical discourse on concepts of rationality and their implications. This dis-
course has led to a large body of mathematical work and kept generations 
of researchers busy, but few serious attempts have been made to understand 
decision making in the real world. Over the last decades, however, decision 
theory has moved toward the sciences and developed its “taste for the facts.” 
Research is now guided by experimental economics, cognitive psychology, be-
havioral biology, and—most recently—neuroscience. Despite the increasingly 
empirical leanings of decision science, the explanatory power of evolutionary 
theory has been neglected. We proposed this Strüngmann Forum to rectify this 
oversight, with the goal of initiating an alternative to the existing axiom-based 
decision theory by developing a theory of decision making founded on evolu-
tionary principles.
Tackling this task requires a broad disciplinary base, and thus we assembled 
a group of researchers from a diverse range of fi elds—including evolutionary 
biology; cognitive, evolutionary, comparative, and developmental psychology; 
Evolution and the mechanisms of decision making. Ernst Strüngmann Forum Report  
(vol. 11, pp. 1-17). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Copyright 2012 MIT Press. Used by permission.
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neuroscience; computer science; economics, and philosophy—to approach 
this goal.
Toward a Darwinian Decision Theory
In 1654, Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat laid the foundation for our current 
theory of decision making by developing the notion of expected value (Daston 
1995). Accordingly, a reasonable organism need only estimate the value of an 
outcome, weight this value by the probability of the outcome occurring, and 
choose the outcome offering the highest expectation. This view was formal-
ized mathematically in the 20th century, but for the most part it has remained 
unchanged. Despite the beauty of the theory, its descriptive validity has been 
plagued by contradictory data. In numerous cases, humans and other animals 
systematically violate the predictions made by decision theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 2000; Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Rosati and Stevens 2009): They seek 
risks when the theory predicts that they should avoid them. They prefer imme-
diate rewards when they should wait. They place a premium on items in their 
possession when trading offers a better deal. In short, decision theory all too 
often fails to predict behavior.
In the rush to catalog violations of decision theory, economists and psy-
chologists failed to propose a viable alternative to the existing theory. When 
they did propose alternatives, they simply patched up the existing theory (e.g., 
 prospect theory; see Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Whenever a new viola-
tion appeared, a new patch was placed over the old theory. Repairing the old 
theory, however, poses two problems. First, having too many patches greatly 
complicates the theory and suggests that the foundation of the theory is fl awed. 
Second, the original decision theory and its successors ignore two factors criti-
cal to understanding decision making: evolution and cognitive mechanisms.
The current mismatch between decision theory and data highlights the ben-
efi ts of starting afresh in our study of decision making. For the purposes of 
this Forum, we anticipated initiating a theory of decision making that rests on 
an evolutionary foundation by building from fi rst principles. Note that this 
theory was intended to encompass not only human decision making but rather 
a theory of decision making that transcends a particular species and explores 
the general principles of how evolution can generate decision-making agents, 
biological or artifi cial.
This Strüngmann Forum assembled experts from varied disciplines to in-
tegrate a careful understanding of evolution with precise models of cognitive 
mechanisms. Our aim was to develop a springboard for the construction of a 
 Darwinian decision theory from which deeper insights could be gained about 
the functionality of cognitive design. To this end, we discussed four key com-
ponents of a Darwinian approach to decision making: (a) understanding the or-
igins of decision mechanisms, (b) exploring why these mechanisms are robust, 
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(c) accounting for  variation between and within individuals, and (d) investigat-
ing the pressures of social life on decision making. In this introductory chapter, 
we explore a few general themes that draw on discussions across these four 
areas. In particular, we enumerate six of the many reasons why a Darwinian 
approach could aid our understanding of decision making. 
Reasons for Invoking Evolution in Decision Theory
What would a Darwinian decision maker look like? Would she make transi-
tive, consistent, logical decisions? Perhaps. Chater (this volume) refers to this 
as  formal rationality (i.e., an emphasis on consistency in decision making). It 
seems unlikely, however, that natural selection would favor  transitivity, con-
sistency, and logic per se. Selection should favor successful rather than con-
sistent decisions. While  consistency may pay off in some situations, it may 
in others provide no benefi ts or even be costly when behavioral variation is 
favored (Brown et al., this volume). This idea maps onto Chater’s notion of 
substantive rationality, which refers to decisions that require “an external stan-
dard, against which the quality of a decision can be measured.” A Darwinian 
approach would provide substantive rationality because evolutionary fi tness 
provides the ultimate external standard that selects for successful decision 
mechanisms (Stevens 2008; McNamara and Houston 2009; Hagen et al., this 
volume). Bearing in mind the evolutionary version of substantive rationality, 
we can begin to develop general principles of Darwinian decision making.
Adaptive  Specialization
From a biological point of view, the evolved decision mechanisms of a given 
species are expected to operate very effi ciently in those environments that typi-
cally occurred during the evolutionary past of the species. Since a high degree 
of effi ciency cannot be achieved by a general-purpose device, these mecha-
nisms have likely been tuned to the environmental circumstances under which 
they have been used. This adaptive specialization is a key reason for “invoking 
Darwin” in the study of decision making.1
Though not without controversy (see Bolhuis and Macphail 2001), the 
notion of adaptive specialization in animal cognition and decision making 
is widespread (Shettleworth 2000). From spatial memory in caching birds 
(Kamil et al. 1994) to temporal preferences in primates (Rosati et al. 2007), 
we observe examples of cognitive abilities and decisions that differ among 
1 A Darwinian account is not restricted to adaptive explanations of behavior. A comprehensive 
Darwinian account includes infl uences of genetic drift, mutation, gene fl ow, and phylogenetic 
history. Though we do not consider these alternative mechanisms and constraints on evolu-
tion here, phylogenetic history is critical to the comparative approach taken by many decision 
scientists.
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phylogenetically closely related species in ways that match the adaptive prob-
lems faced by those species in their natural environments. We, therefore, have 
evidence of adaptive  specialization in animals.
Evolutionary psychologists use the concept of  modularity to highlight the 
adaptive specialization of cognition in humans. Kurzban (this volume) argues 
that, rather than using Fodor’s (1983) very strict and multifaceted defi nition of 
a cognitive module, the evolutionary module is defi ned by functional special-
ization. For instance, one of the classic examples proposed for evolutionary 
modules is  cheater detection. Cosmides et al. (2010) argue that although peo-
ple have diffi culty solving abstract reasoning problems, they succeed when the 
problem is couched as an evolutionarily relevant situation, namely detecting 
cheaters. The authors contend that our minds did not evolve to solve content-
free, abstract logical puzzles using P’s and Q’s. We did evolve, however, to 
avoid playing the sucker. When the logical puzzle is phrased as a social ex-
change, our “cheater-detection module” kicks in to solve the problem. Kurzban 
acknowledges the controversy surrounding the notion of an evolved module 
and provides justifi cation for its utility.
In the evolutionary psychology tradition, Cosmides and Tooby (1994) liken 
the modular brain to a Swiss army knife. Analogously, in the judgment and 
decision-making fi eld, Gigerenzer et al. (1999) endorse the “ adaptive toolbox” 
approach of investigating the cognitive mechanisms used in specifi c decision 
contexts. Based on insights from Simon’s (1956) concept of  bounded rational-
ity, the adaptive toolbox approach emphasizes  fast and frugal  heuristics that 
organisms use to solve adaptive problems. In the biological tradition, these 
heuristics are called “ rules of thumb” (Hutchinson and Gigerenzer 2005). 
Though specifi c for a particular context rather than general purpose, these de-
cision rules are not necessarily limited to a content domain. Adams et al. (this 
volume) provide behavioral and neural data on decision making in rhesus ma-
caques (Macaca mulatta) which suggests that the same decision algorithms 
can apply across social and nonsocial domains. In particular, they argue that 
when  macaques forage for food or search for information in their social envi-
ronment, they use a comparable decision rule that simply weighs their return 
(on food or information) against a fi xed threshold.
Work on foraging in humans has demonstrated that people use similar deci-
sion rules in very different types of foraging; for instance, physical foraging for 
food in an artifi cial fi shing task and cognitive foraging for words in memory 
(Hutchinson et al. 2008; Wilke et al. 2009). Though applicable across content 
domains, these rules are by no means general purpose. Instead, they are likely 
tuned to the statistical structure of the environment (Hills et al. 2008). Thus, 
we might expect similar decision rules to operate in the foraging,  social infor-
mation search, and memory retrieval domains if all of these problems involve 
a common statistical problem to solve, such as fi nding objects in a clumped 
distribution.
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Despite the advantages of specialized decision rules, disadvantages exist 
as well. An important diffi culty faced by the toolbox approach is the strategy 
selection problem (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2010; Marewski and Schooler 
2011). As discussed by Kacelnik (this volume), Kurzban (this volume), and 
Mussweiler (this volume), having an  adaptive toolbox requires selecting the 
correct tool for the current circumstance. How does an organism “know” 
which rule or strategy to use in which situation?
Kacelnik (this volume) criticizes the decision rules approach for ignoring 
the role of learning. He argues that, rather than selecting among specifi c deci-
sion rules, organisms can and do use  reinforcement learning to solve many dif-
ferent problems. The question is: What is learned? Kacelnik assumes that the 
behaviors are what are learned. There is evidence, however, that strategies are 
learned as well. Humans, for instance, can learn to use the appropriate strategy 
for a given decision environment (Rieskamp and Otto 2006). Learning, there-
fore, leads to selecting the correct tool from the toolbox and thus a solution to 
the strategy selection problem. Nevertheless, more work is needed to address 
how organisms choose among the many possible decision strategies that they 
can implement. A Darwinian account could provide fruitful insight into this 
question.
A second (and related) critique of the decision rules approach is that we 
already have good evidence of a general-purpose decision-making mechanism, 
namely reinforcement learning (Kacelnik, this volume; Dayan, this volume). 
Though learning can apply across a range of circumstances, it is by no means 
unbounded. A Darwinian approach reminds us of the restrictions on learning. 
As an evolved mechanism, learning faces constraints and biases tailored to-
ward evolutionarily relevant problems.
Learning Prepared by Evolution
Since learning plays an extremely important role in human decision making, 
it is often thought that evolutionary biology cannot contribute much to the 
study of human behavior. In fact, many scholars in the humanities and social 
sciences consider decision making as a process governed mainly by experience 
and the imprints of culture in our minds (e.g., Sahlins 1976). However, experi-
ence needs to be acquired and cultural knowledge has to be gained. Evolution 
certainly has shaped the fundamental learning mechanisms by which this can 
be achieved. More generally, for any given animal species, the learning mecha-
nisms are likely tailored in such a way to facilitate learning the specifi c things 
that matter for survival and reproduction under ecological conditions typical 
for their evolution. In other words, rather than being an omnipotent tool, learn-
ing is prepared to satisfy the particular (historic) needs of a species in an ef-
fi cient way. The evolutionary  preparedness of  learning is thus fundamental to 
understanding mechanisms of decision making. It explains the impact of  cul-
ture on humans’ choices of action as well as the diffi culty a rat has in learning 
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to associate nausea with the ring of a bell (see Hammerstein and Boyd, this 
volume).
The specifi city argument has its limitations in that evolution cannot easily 
respond to emerging needs of a species by developing appropriate mechanisms 
entirely from scratch. It usually has to modify existing machinery, and the 
modifi ed machinery will thus be subject to “ optimization under phylogenetic 
constraints.” Furthermore, there seems to be little use of loading the same brain 
with a great variety of different  learning procedures, one for each problem. 
Even if almost unlimited mental resources allowed this to happen, an evolving 
species could then easily be trapped by “ overfitting” its learning machinery to 
environments that are short-lived on the evolutionary timescale (Gluck et al., 
this volume). In the evolutionary picture of learning, there is thus space for psy-
chological laws and principles that are valid under a wide range of conditions.
Such principles have been found in experimental psychology, but they 
percolated little through the disciplinary boundaries between psychology and 
biology. Kacelnik (this volume) rightly complains that, from its start,  behav-
ioral ecology addressed behavioral mechanisms as if experimental psychology 
never existed. In his view, established psychology—with its search for gener-
ality—was replaced by a search for  rules of thumb which were generated and 
abandoned in an ad hoc fashion to interpret experiments within the narrow 
scope of their setting. Kacelnik considers one of the “fl agships” in theoretical 
behavioral ecology, the  marginal value theorem (Charnov 1976), and argues 
that predictions obtained from “sailing this ship” can be signifi cantly improved 
and almost independently achieved with the fi ndings of experimental psychol-
ogy in mind.
Dayan (this volume) demonstrates nicely how the reasoning about general 
psychological principles can be combined with reasoning about specifi c adap-
tations. Looking at Pavlovian control of behavior, he stresses the broad range 
of problems that can be addressed through this mechanism. Dayan also em-
phasizes that animals have a rather limited repertoire of specifi c actions that 
evolution has “found to be useful” and which are triggered through Pavlovian 
learning.  Pavlovian control thus seems to combine generality with specifi city 
in a way that allows animals to cope quickly with variation in their typical 
environments.
Social animals are prepared to learn both individually and socially. Evolution 
tunes the balance between these mechanisms for acquiring information and 
made the human species uniquely dependent on  social learning. Spreading 
rapidly all over the globe, humans needed quick responses to new environ-
ments which included the development of new tools and social arrangements. 
Hammerstein and Boyd (this volume) describe how learning from each other 
enables us to accumulate information across generations and acquire the tools, 
beliefs, and practices that single individuals could never have invented. Almost 
paradoxically, the accumulation of knowledge about adaptive practices hinges 
to a large extent on the fact that people often do not understand why culturally 
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transmitted behavior is adaptive. The crucial point here is that  children learn to 
do what they are supposed to do without much cognitive interference. Human 
learning is biased toward  conformism, and children receive most of their cul-
tural information from older individuals who have a tendency to discourage 
questions by the young learner. This has the advantage that we do not waste 
our time trying to fi gure out what may be diffi cult or impossible to understand.
Do we really fi nd it convincing that conformist elements in human learning 
govern our decisions toward adaptive behavior? Conformism means that we 
also learn to do things that have no adaptive value and which may even be harm-
ful. Despite this drawback, evolution can favor forms of conformism strongly 
enough to induce occasional maladaptive “ herding effects” in populations. A 
population then goes through phases where most, if not all, of its members 
make harmful decisions (Hammerstein and Boyd, this volume). This insight 
from evolutionary theory is of relevance to fi nancial markets and helps us un-
derstand what economists call the “ foolishness of the crowd.” Understanding 
the adaptive nature of and constraints on different types of learning can inform 
how learning is used in decision making.
Mental Adaptations to Sociality
As discussed in the previous section, human learning is evolutionarily pre-
pared to lead us through life in a highly social environment. Without this pre-
paredness, particularly the conformist tendencies, human culture could hardly 
exist, and no one would have ever built a kayak, airplane, or spaceship.  Human 
sociality is also based on a number of mental mechanisms beyond learning, 
which will be described below. These are superb cognitive features but not 
the ones on which economic decision theory is built. Economists typically 
envision a merchant who has learned arithmetic at school, effectively treat-
ing  information processing as a “black box” (Bugnyar et al., this volume). In 
our evolutionary past, however, there was no  teaching of mathematics and our 
Stone Age ancestors did not possess an abacus, slide ruler, or pocket calculator. 
They had to rely on means other than calculation to make their decisions. For 
this reason, and guided by empirical research on child development, Warneken 
and Rosati (this volume) advocate an alternative way of thinking about  altru-
ism and  cooperation.
In Warneken and Rosati’s view, a decision to help or collaborate may be 
driven more strongly by intention attribution than by explicit calculations of 
costs and benefi ts. Children are able to differentiate intentions from behavioral 
outcomes and can tell, for example, whether a person is unwilling to hand 
them a toy or is unable to do so. This attribution of  intentions makes it pos-
sible for the child to direct cooperative behavior preferentially to persons with 
cooperative intentions. The identifi cation of intentions seems more important 
to social partner choice than engaging in the kind of payoff calculations around 
which economic theory is built.  Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) share with us 
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some of the intention-attribution skills, yet we seem to outcompete them in our 
ability to form  joint  intentions—an important mental adaptation to sociality 
(Tomasello et al. 2005).
Emotions are another prominent feature of our minds, and  sociality cru-
cially depends on some of them. Conventional decision theory is surprisingly 
devoid of this issue and, as Jensen (this volume) puts it, philosophers have long 
viewed emotions as the enemy of reason. Jensen gives his picture of how the 
emotions govern positive and negative concerns for others. Like Warneken and 
Rosati, he emphasizes our ability to detect others’ goals and describes positive 
social concern as an emotional state that motivates the actor to reduce the suf-
fering of others and to seek their emotional well-being. Jensen disagrees with 
the idea of “ psychological hedonism,” in which altruistic behavior is seen as a 
selfi sh attempt to obtain internal rewards with no genuine concern for the re-
cipient of the altruistic act. In his view, the primary objective of  altruism is the 
well-being of others and not the internal reward that comes with it.
Not all social concern is positive, as suggested by the terms “ moralistic  ag-
gression,” “punitive sentiments,” or “ moral outrage.” People (including chil-
dren) do punish others for causing harm even if they have not been harmed 
themselves. Jensen (this volume) promotes the idea that human properties like 
spitefulness,  schadenfreude,  jealousy, and  envy may be important enforcers 
of  cooperation that stabilize prosocial behaviors and may be regarded as the 
backbone of human  prosociality. According to Jensen, much less evidence ex-
ists for such a backbone in the social life of chimpanzees. Hammerstein and 
Boyd (this volume) emphasize that conventional decision theory has always 
made humans look intellectually superior to  chimpanzees but it failed to grasp 
the important emotions to which Jensen discusses in his chapter. For example, 
game theorists found a fl aw in the logic of deterrence and convinced them-
selves that it would never work in a world of rational decision makers. Their 
conclusion was that in real life, deterrence can only work because humans are 
not rational and also do not view their opponents as rational players.
Social psychologists and anthropologists, on the other hand, have actu-
ally studied a commitment device used in  deterrence:  anger (Nelissen and 
Zeelenberg 2009). The emotion anger prevents in-depth reasoning, causes us 
to take great  risks, and sometimes carries us into absurdly costly forms of 
retaliation (e.g., road rage). Hammerstein and Boyd view emotions as both 
promoters and inhibitors of sociality and make the point that the targets of 
anger are shaped by  cultural evolution. The degree of violence in response to 
transgressions, for example, may differ dramatically between two cultures if 
people value personal honor more strongly in one than in the other. Anger can, 
in principle, stabilize any norm defi ned by culture, not all of which are benefi -
cial to society. Anthropologists have indeed described a variety of norms that 
are deleterious, such as  mortuary cannibalism (Whitfi eld et al. 2008).
Mussweiler (this volume) argues more generally that the complexity of so-
cial information in our everyday life can only be handled through a number of 
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selective steps that determine (a) the information to which we should attend, 
(b) the  information-processing tools to be used, and (c) the set of behavioral 
options from which one will fi nally be chosen. These three steps are ignored in 
conventional decision theory, where decision makers make use of all informa-
tion they have, possess only one tool for processing it (utility maximization), 
and take all behavioral options into account. Evolution, however, has fabri-
cated a fundamentally different decision maker who may look less ingenious 
to mathematicians but works astonishingly well in practice. To understand real 
decisions, we must understand how natural selection has shaped the selection 
steps highlighted by Mussweiler. Adams et al. (this volume) agree that so-
cial stimuli engage specialized mechanisms for the acquisition and processing 
of  social information, but they assert that the decision rules used may be the 
same as those used in nonsocial situations. These perspectives highlight the 
need to explore the specifi city of cognitive mechanisms to social situations. 
Nevertheless, they indicate that a “bottom-up” approach of investigating the 
cognitive mechanisms is critical to understanding the evolution of decision 
making in a social world (see also Bugnyar et al., this volume).
Error Management
We have already seen that a Darwinian decision maker may be biased in (a) the 
contexts in which the decision mechanisms operate adaptively, (b) the types 
of information that can be learned easily, (c) the way that social information 
is fi ltered and processed, and (d) the triggers of emotional responses.  Error 
management theory (Nettle, this volume) predicts that we will see biases in 
the types of errors made when we make inferences about the state of the world 
(Haselton and Buss 2000). Not all errors are created equally.
From the evolutionary perspective, the handling of errors in the decision-
making machinery must refl ect the effect of these errors on an organism’s sur-
vival and reproduction ( fi tness). When different types of errors result in differ-
ent costs, we would expect to see biased decision making. Natural selection 
will likely favor the avoidance of even small errors if they incur high costs in 
terms of fi tness. In contrast, seemingly large errors (e.g., a male mating with 
a member of the wrong species) may not face strong selective pressure if they 
have little impact on fi tness. This is referred to as the “smoke detector prin-
ciple” (Nesse 2001b). A smoke detector’s job is not to minimize the numbers 
of errors it makes. Its job is to detect the presence of smoke in order to save 
lives. In doing its job, smoke detectors are biased to give an alarm when no 
smoke is present (a false alarm) rather than fail to give an alarm when smoke 
is present (a miss). Many inattentive cooks have suffered the indignity of fan-
ning at a smoke detector after burning a meal. Despite the inconvenience and 
embarrassment of a false alarm, fanning a smoke detector or even evacuating 
a building is preferable to a smoke detector not triggering in the presence of a 
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real fi re. We will pay the minimal costs of false alarms to avoid the devastation 
of a miss.
Kareev (this volume) argues that this bias toward avoiding misses is a core 
property of human decision making based on the potential benefi ts of using our 
limited  short-term  memory to detect patterns in our environment. This is an ap-
propriate strategy when the costs of misses outweigh the costs of false alarms, 
as is seen in the smoke detector example, as well as when avoiding predators, 
predicting the impact of a looming object, attributing agency to objects in the 
environment, and detecting signals of sexual interest from potentials mates 
(Nettle, this volume). When false alarm costs outweigh those of misses, how-
ever, we see the opposite pattern with greater sensitivity to false alarms. For 
instance, females may be biased toward accurately detecting honest signals of 
male parental investment (Haselton and Buss 2000). Missing an investing male 
is not as costly as succumbing to the false advertising of a deadbeat.
Considering the costs of errors, therefore, is critical to understanding why 
we observe biases in decision making. Though  signal detection theory and 
 expected utility theory also incorporate the costs of errors, Nettle (this volume) 
argues that the evolutionary approach via error management theory makes key 
predictions about the kinds of contexts in which we would expect to see biased 
decision making; namely, contexts with important implications for evolution-
ary fi tness. Moreover, due to the lag in natural selection’s ability to adapt or-
ganisms to their environment, error management theory can explain potential 
biases in situations in which no current cost differential exists, though histori-
cally strong evolutionary pressures may have resulted in divergent costs. Thus, 
while the occurrence of errors as such relates to mechanistic properties of the 
mental machinery, the management of these errors cannot be understood with-
out exploring the evolutionary question of which errors in decision making are 
tolerable and which are not.
Robustness and the Mechanisms behind It
From an engineer’s point of view,  robustness is the ability of a system to main-
tain its functionality across a wide range of operational conditions. Different 
conditions arise, for example, from  environmental variation, noisy input,  slop-
piness or breakdown of system components, and subversion by parasites. In 
the course of evolution, organisms are expected to adapt their behavior to 
the variety of conditions under which they have to survive and reproduce. 
Robustness as a concept is, therefore, of great relevance to the Darwinian ap-
proach to decision making. Flack et al. (this volume) describe the various ways 
in which biologists have used this concept at different levels of organization: 
from molecular systems to individual decision making and animal societies.
Most organisms operate in a highly variable and complex world. How do 
organisms make decisions when facing large temporal variation and spatial 
heterogeneity? To meet the enormous challenges, humans and other species 
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must detect regularities in their new physical and social environments. At fi rst 
glance, our brain seems poorly equipped for this task. Our short-term memory, 
for example, can hold just a few items at a time. This may seem ridiculously 
small for a storing device. Kareev (this volume) makes the interesting point, 
however, that limited  short-term  memory actually has a number of advantages 
when individuals are in search of unknown regularities. It forces us to do much 
of our “mental statistics” on the basis of small samples. Correlations are then 
likely to appear stronger than they actually are and variance is typically un-
derestimated. This amplifi cation of correlations makes it easier to detect the 
regularities and, in this sense, improves our mechanisms for exploration. There 
is a drawback, of course, since occasionally we will fi nd correlations that do 
not exist at all (i.e., the world will look more regular than it is). But, returning 
to error management theory, it may be more costly for individuals to overlook 
important regularities than to “fantasize” a few.
Kareev (this volume) offers further arguments why it can pay to rely only 
on a very limited number of recent experiences in decision making. Such a 
self-imposed restriction can make it easier for organisms to follow changes in 
the environment because it helps them avoid  overfi tting to conditions that vary 
in space and time (Gluck et al., this volume). Furthermore, remembering too 
many past events involves the  risk of always lagging far behind in fast-chang-
ing environments. Dayan (this volume) emphasizes the fact that information 
stored in our  working  memory degrades more or less gracefully as memory is 
taxed. The evolved working memory’s design thus differs considerably from 
that of a human-designed computer, which stores information with extreme 
reliability in addressable locations until a voluntary act of deletion occurs.
Gallistel (this volume) has diffi culties accepting the idea that the brain is 
fundamentally different from a computer in that it lacks an  addressable read-
write  memory. He explains why such a memory is taken by computer scientists 
to be the foundation of any powerful computing machine. He then reviews 
evidence that behavior is mediated by computational  information processing 
that deals with extensive data structures, as demonstrated, for example, by ex-
periments that reveal the contents of the cache memory of food-caching birds 
(Clayton et al. 2001a). He asks whether the conceptual chasm between the 
computer science understanding of the essential role that a symbolic, read-
write, addressable memory mechanism plays in any powerful computing ma-
chine and the neuroscience conception of memory, which is not symbolic, not 
read-write, and not addressable, is a problem for computer science or a prob-
lem for neuroscience.
Among the obstacles in addressing environments are the inherent uncertain-
ties that need to be handled, which arise from our ignorance as well as from 
environmental change. Dayan (this volume) discusses how evolution has pre-
pared our brains for the challenges posed by  uncertainty. For example, in his 
view the brain “offers” itself an exploration bonus when assessing the payoffs 
relating to actions. This bonus supposedly drives our exploratory behavior. 
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But how do we know about the existence of such a quantity? Dayan interprets 
some experimental fi ndings from neuroscience as keys to how the bonus mani-
fests itself in the brain. Novel objects, for example, generate temporary activity 
in the  dopamine system that resembles the activity triggered by unpredicted 
“true” rewards.
Discussing robustness at a higher level of abstraction, Dayan (this volume) 
sees two sources of noise that pose a major threat to it. There is noise associ-
ated with incomplete and ineffi cient learning in what he calls the model-free 
system, and there is noise inherent in the complex calculations performed by 
the brain with its limited potential for computation. The latter limitation be-
comes particularly visible when our decisions are based on internal models 
of reality. These models enable us, however, to predict events under changed 
conditions long before learning could achieve anything.
Kurzban (this volume) takes a perspective on robustness in which the brain 
is already equipped with a number of tools that allow us to act as if we had 
indeed modeled some aspects of reality. He argues, for example, that our an-
cestors typically encountered a spatially and temporally autocorrelated world 
when searching for water, food, and other important items. The a priori expec-
tation of autocorrelation may thus be one of the innate biases that evolution 
has implemented in our decision-making machinery. This would explain why 
human predictions are often based on the implicit assumption that events come 
in “streaks” and are particularly likely to occur after they just occurred—the 
“ hot-hand” phenomenon (Wilke and Barrett 2009).
A fi nal word must be said about  redundancy, an extremely important design 
principle used by human engineers in their efforts to create robust machinery 
(Flack et al., this volume). Space ships are, for example, equipped with sev-
eral computers, each of which performs the same calculations. If one of them 
makes a calculation error, this computer can be “outvoted” by the other two 
machines. Dayan (this volume) argues that the robustness of animal and human 
decision making is also supported by a fundamentally different kind of redun-
dancy. Instead of just having duplicates of subroutines or other mechanisms, 
we have different computational devices that rely on very different procedures 
to perform similar tasks. This kind of redundancy protects against both errors 
in computing and maladaptive properties of the implicit models on which these 
computations are based. Dayan views decision making as a permanent struggle 
for the “brain’s attention” by different mechanisms that provide the kind of 
redundancy just described. Evolution seems to have equipped our minds with 
elements of internal competition to maintain robust decision making.
Biological Roots of Variation
If there  is one thing that remains constant in decision making, it is variability. 
Despite the sincere wish of economists—that a single equation and set of pa-
rameters can hold for all decision makers in all situations—this is not to be. For 
Six Reasons for Invoking Evolution in Decision Theory 13
instance, many researchers are interested in the rate of discounting that people 
employ (i.e., the rate at which future benefi ts are devalued). Frederick et al. 
(2002) contend that measures of discounting have not converged on a single 
discount rate as has happened with the speed of light. In fact, studies measur-
ing discount rates yield values ranging from a negative discount rate (meaning 
a preference for delayed rewards over immediate rewards) to an infi nite dis-
count rate (meaning the strongest possible preference for immediate rewards 
over delayed rewards). Economists tend to sweep variation like this under the 
rug or treat it as noise. 
Can a  Darwinian approach account for variation? Though variation is a key 
component of natural selection,  evolutionary  game theory models typically pre-
dict a single best solution or small set of best solutions to an adaptive problem. 
We observe individual differences in behavior across a broad spectrum of species 
and in a wide range of contexts. In addition, within individuals we see frequent 
variation in behavior. Both between- and  within-individual variation greatly ex-
ceeds that expected by many of these models, and understanding the role of this 
variation will be important in developing a theory of decision making.
To this end, biologists have turned to psychology as a fi eld that takes varia-
tion seriously. To minimize  anthropomorphism, some biologists refer to in-
dividual differences in the behavior of  animals as “behavioral syndromes.” 
Bolder researchers use the same term as applied to humans: personalities. 
Evolutionary models are beginning to explore adaptive accounts of the breadth 
of variation between individuals in their behavior (Dingemanse and Wolf, this 
volume; Dall et al. this volume). However, these models tend to focus on be-
havioral polymorphism and do not account for many interesting aspects ob-
served in individual differences.
A key attribute of  personality is not just consistent individual differences 
but also stability across contexts. For instance, one of the classic  personality 
traits in animals is the bold-shy continuum, in which individuals range from 
novelty seeking to neophobic. Dingemanse and Wolf (this volume) describe 
early work on  stickleback, in which fi sh who act aggressively toward conspe-
cifi cs intruding on their territory are also more likely to approach potential 
predators. This correlation of  boldness appears across a range of species, and 
Dingemanse and Wolf (this volume) highlight a growing interest in the genetic 
and physiological mechanisms underlying similar behavior across contexts. 
For instance, researchers are conducting quantitative genetic analyses which 
show strong genetic components, molecular genetic analyses that reveal candi-
date genes, neuroendocrine analyses of coping styles and stress response, and 
correlations of metabolic rates with behavioral differences.
In addition to mechanisms underlying personality, biologists are now be-
ginning to ask critical questions about possible advantages of both behavioral 
 consistency and correlated traits (Dingemanse and Wolf, this volume). Do cor-
related traits provide benefi ts to individuals or are they simply by-products of 
the genetic and physiological mechanisms underlying behavior? Research on 
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spiders shows that, though bold individuals gain benefi ts in foraging situations, 
their aggressiveness imposes costs on fertility when aggressive females can-
nibalize potential mates before copulation (Johnson and Sih 2005). Thus, the 
correlated trait results in adaptive trade-offs. Would an individual be better off 
bold with food and shy with mates? Regardless of the adaptive benefi ts of cor-
related traits, they are real and therefore require our attention. Dall et al. (this 
volume) emphasize that this reality means that we cannot necessarily treat dif-
ferent adaptive problems as independent. As the previous example illustrates, 
the mating game is not independent from the predator avoidance game, and 
this has critical implications for how we model behavior. Understanding the 
adaptive value of and constraints on behavioral consistency and correlations 
will offer key insight into the evolution of decision making. 
Individual differences provide one type of variability, but we also observe 
variation within individuals. Brown et al. (this volume), suggest that  within-
individual variation can result from noise, context,  mood,  life span changes, 
and prior experience. Noise in behavior can provide benefi ts when individuals 
want to exhibit unpredictable behavior. This can occur when trying to avoid 
predators or to make a credible threat of irrational behavior. Though some 
decisions appear rather capricious, a careful examination of the situation may 
highlight important context-specifi c predictors of behavior. Facebook notwith-
standing, we often behave differently among family, friends, and strangers. 
Similarly, members of other species decide differently with a (potential) mate, 
rival, or dominant present. Even in the same context, our moods can have criti-
cal infl uences our actions. Brown et al. (this volume) describe how positive 
moods and pessimism shape decision making in humans and other animals. 
For instance, inducing a positive mood shifts people’s risky decision making 
away from focusing on probabilities of reward and toward focusing on out-
comes (Nygren et al. 1996).
Variation in decision making also occurs over the life span. Early in life, 
juvenile animals and human children demonstrate changes in decision mak-
ing as various cognitive capacities come online during development (Jensen, 
this volume; Warneken and Rosati, this volume). At the other end of the con-
tinuum, we see modifi cations in decision making as adults age. Brown et al. 
(this volume) review research which suggests that  cognitive aging results in 
increases in  risk avoidance, patience for future rewards, weighting of losses 
compared to gains, and altruistic behavior. They also highlight the role of prior 
experience in decision making. The  decision-by-sampling approach accounts 
for how sampling from the distribution of prior experience via  long-term  mem-
ory can infl uence decisions (Stewart et al. 2006). For instance, risky choices 
for mortality-related decisions correlate with the risk of mortality faced in a 
given participant’s country (Olivola and Sagara 2009), suggesting that risky 
choices match the distribution of experience in the world. Thus, individuals 
with different experiences, or more specifi cally different memories, will ex-
hibit different choices.
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The study of variation from a biological approach remains in its infancy. At 
the moment, psychology has a lot to offer to an evolutionary account of varia-
tion in behavior both between and within individuals. Despite the standard ten-
dency to “control for” this variation, the psychology of individual differences 
will be critical in informing a  Darwinian approach to decision making.
Concluding Remarks
After describing several reasons for invoking evolution in decision theory, we 
now discuss at a more general level to what extent this helps us understand 
the mechanisms of decision making. Let us fi rst play the devil’s advocate and 
question the importance of marrying evolution with cognitive science. Most of 
the advancements in  behavioral ecology, for example, were made by explicitly 
ignoring cognition and treating evolution as if natural selection acted directly 
on behavioral traits (the so-called “behavioral gambit”; Fawcett et al. 2012). 
Research programs in this fi eld were particularly successful because they used 
the shortcut of circumventing the nitty-gritty of cognitive machinery. We must 
admit that using this shortcut has its rationale. Evolutionary theory cannot pre-
dict mechanisms as such, since in principle many different mechanisms can 
serve as a tool for solving the same problem. To use an analogy from engineer-
ing, there are many ways to design a clock, but all that a well-engineered clock 
can tell us with high accuracy is what time of the day it is.
As convincing as this multiplicity argument may sound in defense of clas-
sical research programs, it is also quite misleading. We use our wristwatch at 
different temperatures, for example, and may even leave it on while swim-
ming. The mechanism operating the watch must therefore tolerate changes in 
temperature and pressure and continue to work adequately while being sub-
mersed in water. More generally, the more we know about the conditions under 
which a mechanism has to operate, the better we are able to refl ect necessary 
specifi cations  for its design. So, despite the fact that evolutionary theory can-
not simply predict the entire mechanisms of decision making, it can inform us 
about fundamental properties that the evolved mechanisms can be expected 
to possess. As the chapters of this volume document nicely, these properties 
include (a) biases in learning,  error management, and information usage, (b) 
robust responses to variation in the  environment, (c) variation within and be-
tween decision makers, and (d) specializations for coping with complex social 
situations.
It is also important to state properties that are unlikely to exist. For ex-
ample, one would not expect  consistency to be a general property of evolved 
decision mechanisms (see, however, Chater as well as Hagen et al., both this 
volume). An evolutionary theory of decision mechanisms, therefore, strongly 
undermines the approach that dominated decision theory in economics for 
more than the last hundred years. Research combining evolution and cognition 
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does indeed give us good reasons to knock economic decision theory off its 
pedestal.
There are two more important aspects of evolutionary analysis which de-
serve general attention. One is the phylogenetic approach in which ancestral 
mechanisms are considered as starting points from which decision mechanisms 
evolved. Studying decision making in phylogenetically closely related species 
such as  chimpanzees (Jensen, this volume; Warneken and Rosati, this volume) 
can provide unique insights into the human condition. Humans and chimpan-
zees differ, for example, in how they learn from others. However, chimpanzees 
do show sophisticated forms of social cognition that offer a foundation for 
understanding our own social decision making. The second important aspect of 
evolutionary analysis is the comparative approach; that is the study of how dif-
ferent species cope with similar kinds of problems. The comparative approach 
offers a glimpse into how the environment shapes decision mechanisms by 
comparing decisions across species that both face similar environmental pres-
sures and are adapted to different environments. For instance, from  honeybees 
to hummingbirds and locusts to  starlings, we see similar effects of context 
on decision making that violate classical decision theory (Rosati and Stevens 
2009; Hagen et al., this volume). The ubiquity of these behaviors across spe-
cies suggests that natural selection has shaped decision mechanisms to solve 
a widely applicable problem. On the other hand, differences in environmental 
pressures can be used to predict differences in decision making, such as when 
foraging ecology matches temporal preferences in chimpanzees and bonobos 
(Rosati et al. 2007).
In summary, evolutionary theory is, of course, far from being anything like 
an omnipotent explanatory device. It can shed light on why all sorts of biases 
and apparently odd effects exist in human decision making, why Homo sapiens 
is far from being anything like a “relative” of Homo economicus, and why we 
are nevertheless quite successful in addressing our everyday problems. From 
an evolutionary perspective there seems to be a logic behind decision making 
in humans and animals, but it is a logic that makes individuals successful in 
real life without caring about axioms of rationality. We thus see the contours of 
a new decision theory and wish to merge cognition and evolution further in or-
der to root this theory fi rmly in empirical grounds and make sense of the facts.
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